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3. Users and uses of the biopolitics of consent: a study of DNA
banks
Pascal Ducournau, Anne Cambon-Thomsen
Abstract:
In this chapter we intend to examine from a sociological perspective the view of a
number of participants in a biobank project on the informed consent procedure they were
asked to go through. Having carried out observations, conducted interviews and
collected questionnaires as part of an empirical survey, we have concluded that a number
of participants feel somewhat suspicious where the procedure is concerned. At least they
express caution on its ability to actually serve their autonomy and freedom of choice. As
they attempt to detect its potentially perverse effects in terms of power asymmetry and the
consequences of diverse responsibilities being devolved to them, their perception of it is
far from idealized even if they do not contest it radically. This circumambulatory tour of
the users’ point of view, which will prove useful to improve communication with the
general public, can also be of help in understanding how the contemporary evolutions of
biopolitics are perceived.
Introduction
In light of the contemporary evolution of health management systems run by states or
medical institutions, it has been widely observed that a new approach in managing public
health has emerged: there is greater emphasis on education, consensus and seeking the
consent of individuals and populations. This trend is what Foucault called ‘biopolitics’,
and one of its main characteristics is to encourage individuals to exercise self-control
over behaviour that might affect their health, and over how they make use of the body
and its constituent parts, rather than to resort to direct constraints or impose sanitary
obligations and health rules: proactive prevention policies, community health initiatives,
health education, coaching and patient counselling, gathering informed consent of
individuals in various situations (medical acts, medical research, donations of biological
substances: gametes, bone marrow, DNA, etc).
The concept of biopolitics was first coined by Foucault in order to describe the
advent, in the course of the 18th century, of a mighty shift in the exercise of power, from
conquest and ruling over people’s lives to a political technology aimed at fostering life
and boosting its yield (Foucault 1976). The exercise of power, which had been
exclusively grounded in the right to take lives (bringing death upon some and allowing
others to live), as reflected by the lords and monarchs who disposed of the lives of their
subjects for their defence (in time of war or an attempt against their person, etc), slowly
evolved into a form of power that no longer ‘let live’ but ‘gave life’ through multiple
initiatives aimed at managing, increasing, multiplying, exercising control over and
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applying regulations to life at an individual as well as a populational level. Such concern
for life led to the development of a dual control system:
• on the one hand a growing number of disciplines to be exercised on the human
body in order to expand its abilities, draw out its strength, increase its docility;
• on the other hand the introduction of the concept of ‘populational biopolitics’,
centred on the body as a representative of the species, and designed to pace and
monitor the biological processes which affect the population at large, such as
births and deaths, states of health and life spans.
The implementation of this biopolicy has produced new elements of knowledge and new
practices that are at the core of the modern state, such as demography, hygiene, urbanism
and public health. The state must now “take charge of the ‘bodies’,
no longer in order to claim rights over their lives or protect them against the enemy, nor
simply to exercise punishments or extort taxes, but to help them, and maybe even to
compel them to preserve/ take care of their health. The obligation to stay healthy is both
everyone’s duty and the general goal (Foucault 1994:16).
Several observers in the ‘post-Foucault’ line of thinking have been struck by the
connection between the historic shift described in his works and the many initiatives that
have been taken recently to obtain the support, consent or consensus of the population
regarding the management of their health and their bodies. According to Dozon (2001),
these measures show that a new public health paradigm is emerging, one no longer based
on constraints but on a contract. Alternatively, they could mark the advent of a new body-
monitoring system that goes together with the fading away of disciplines, ‘corporeal
liberalism’ and an ‘individualized or delegated biopolicy’ (Memmi 2001, 2003). Without
indulging in a fairy-tale vision of the new paradigm of health and body management, the
existing literature has also stressed that it entails the potential occurrence of complex
power relations. Dozon notes that the constraint paradigm is always likely to resurge.
Memmi in turn remarks that the ideal form of government, based on the self-control
which patients exercise over their biological destiny, often conceals, between the latter
and their doctors, “objective power imbalances such as the unequal availability of
information, technical knowledge and language skills, which leave the patient with no
other option than to give in to the requests of medical professionals” (Memmi 2003: 303-
304). On a different note, Berlivet (2003) draws attention to the quite paradoxical manner
in which modern-day prevention schemes are presented to individuals: it appears that,
while no longer ‘blaming the victims’ and while seeking freedom from addiction and
social pressure which typically induce risky behaviour, prevention and health education
schemes lead the targeted individuals to adopt pre-set identities that they are expected to
identify with (the ‘non-smoker’, the ‘moderate drinker’ etc). The mode of subjectification
which emerges is bipolar: subjugation and empowerment. Following these studies on the
paradoxical nature of the new enforcement tools for health policies, it has been suggested
(Martucelli 2003) that all contemporary initiatives concerning prevention (against cancer,
cardio-vascular diseases, HIV, etc) coincided with the development of a modern form of
domination based on making individuals liable for their health. Domination traditionally
relied on the concept of dependence. However, contemporary forms of domination
encourage subjects to become active. In doing so, they prompt them to take on a number
of responsibilities that have been devolved to them. Through this devolution of
responsibilities, the actors are not expected to abide by a set of norms. Instead they are
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instructed to face facts that are presented as being the logical and unavoidable
consequences of their actions, past or present. To sum up, “it is less a matter of dictating
what needs to be done than to get individuals to realize that they are the ‘authors’ of their
own lives” (Martucelli 2003: 491) and, more importantly, the ‘authors’ of the
consequences of their actions.
This brief look at the existing critical literature provides an overview of the
subject, and gives reasons to believe that we are currently witnessing a subtle refinement
of power relations in the field of biopolitics. Power has acquired the ability to renew itself
through the subjectivity of the actors, to further interfere with their desires, choices and
actions, even to be heard through the assertion of the ego. But are the actors truly being
deceived by the new configuration of power relations? Could the case be that the
implementation of this sort of power relations, based on an original acceptance of
constraints and the individualization of the latter, is taking place without the individuals
concerned (the publics targeted through prevention campaigns, users of health
institutions, patients) knowing and in a manner so inconspicuous that they are bound to
adhere to it without formulating any criticism? This question deserves careful
consideration as two diverging versions of the modern forms of domination can be
derived from its answer: one would set forth its imperative, unavoidable dimension, and
the other would expose its relative nature, one potentially superseded by the interplay of
the actors, who might use their skills to keep it at bay, not letting it influence their
behaviour. The second alternative could bring back the notion that the actors always have
the possibility of calling into play the ‘quant-à-soi’ (keeping to oneself) in the new
context of developing a biopolicy which, it seems, no longer has anything in common
with the era of disciplines described by Foucault.
Field approach and method
The opinions of the actors who most openly welcome the modern-day health and medical
mechanisms set up by health institutions provide a privileged empirical starting-point to
answer the question raised. They enable us to approach the topic from a perspective
which a priori rules out the ‘quant-à-soi’ or ability to keep oneself at a distance, bypass,
become aware of or keep at bay the forms of domination that might accompany the
implementation of these mechanisms. We compiled empirical data collected through a
survey based on ethnographic observation, interviews and questionnaires involving
individuals who agreed to participate in a DNA bank within the framework of an
epidemiological survey, using a procedure designed to gather their free and informed
consent as required by the existing judicial and ethical norms.
This epidemiological survey was based on a comparison between one ‘case
group’ and one group of ‘control subjects’, and was intended to assess the prevalence of
cardio-vascular pathologies among the ‘general population’, to carry out a follow-up and
to identify the risk and protection factors – both genetic and environmental – of the said
pathologies. The originality of this survey consisted in the creation of a DNA bank,
which concerned the ‘general population’ as well as a sample population recruited in a
hospital. In total about 1800 individuals – exclusively men aged between 45 and 75, i.e.
an age group being considered most ‘at risk’ for coronary and vascular diseases – were
recruited in southern France by a laboratory belonging to  the Institut National de la Santé
et de la Recherche Médicale (Inserm) to participate in the study.
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The creation and expansion of DNA banks during the last decade has triggered a
prolific output of normative and speculative texts21 about their stakes and the manner in
which they should be set up, governed and used. It is worth noting that these texts often
put emphasis on the definition of and respect for the rule of informed consent as a
fundamental, sine qua non condition for the realization of DNA bank projects. Thus, a
kind of transnational consensus in favour of the application of this rule has emerged,
while biobank projects not complying with this rule have been met with harsh criticism
both in the specialized press and in the mass media. DNA banks constitute therefore a
selected platform for expressing the modern forms of biopolitics. So, to repeat the
expression coined by Memmi, we are looking at the implementation of an ‘individualized
or delegated biopolicy’ linked to DNA bank projects. Individuals are prompted, in a way
that is undoubtedly new and unprecedented, to exercise through the rule of informed
consent control over what can and cannot be done with the constituent parts of their
bodies.
Thus, the proactive involvement of citizens is vested in this rule, which might
become the keeper of sound judgment against the dangers of human genome research
(Caze de Montgolfier 2002). “Giving participants the opportunity and freedom to
participate in a research protocol puts researchers under the obligation to respect their
choices” (Caze de Montgolfier 2002: 67). Or, as specified in one of the recommendations
of the Human Genome Organisation dating back to 1996 (HUGO-ELSI 1996):
“The HUGO-ELSI Committee recommends […] that any choices made by
participants with regard to storage or other uses of materials or information taken
or derived therefrom be respected. Choices to be informed or not with regard to
results or incidental findings should also be respected. Such choices bind other
researchers and laboratories. In this way, personal, cultural, and community
values can be respected”.
This recommendation originates from a time period – the 1990s – which was marked by
controversies about informed consent, with certain actors claiming that “a hijacking of
the concept of informed consent” was to be feared leading to the use of DNA samples
and the associated medical and social background data for purposes that were not
specified at the beginning of the research, or to a commercial use of genetic sample banks
(Bungener et al. 2002). The fear of such ‘hijackings’ has given rise to an ‘era of
suspicion’ around DNA banks, which the press has pointed out over the past few years.
The fear associated with the use of genetic data to analyze behaviour in a strictly
biological way (violence, homosexuality, alcoholism, schizophrenia etc) has contributed
to stressing the importance of describing the medical and scientific aims of genetic
research projects when seeking the participants’ consent. It is hoped that keeping the
public informed will make it possible to achieve the respect of ‘personal, cultural and
community values’.
In current practice, the application of the concept of informed consent
encapsulated in the protocol for the establishment of DNA banks is meant to put the
individual participating in a research project in a position of ‘informed decision-maker’.
Consequently the informed consent procedure must provide clear guidelines for the
                                                
21
 For this, see review in Cambon-Thomsen et al. 2007.
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biomedical actors involved in the protocol as well as for the individuals recruited,
through the following sequence of actions:
• information must be provided to the subject by the research team in the form of an
explanatory note and through oral communication;
• the team must strive to make the written and oral explanations as clear as they
possibly can so as to ensure correct understanding on the part of the individual
concerned.
The physician is formally requested to evaluate the subject’s understanding of the project,
and to encourage them to ask any questions that might be relevant. The subject is then
asked to sign a consent form indicating that his or her decision to participate in the
project is informed and free. This procedure was carefully followed with regard to the
DNA bank that we observed. We were given the opportunity to observe how the
participants’ consent was gathered over the three years during which the project was
carried out. At the same time we assembled a collection of quantitative data using a
questionnaire filled out by the physician who interviewed the participants. In the
questionnaire the physician documented items regarding the interview, indicated if the
participants had asked questions and whether or not they had signed the informed consent
form after having read it. The physician was also asked to give to each participant another
questionnaire asking for the reasons why they had chosen to take part in the study. We
also carried out about sixty interviews with individuals participating in the study in the
days following their inclusion, some of whom were known to us as we had observed their
interactions with the physician. These interviews were meant to examine more closely the
reasons for their participation, to analyze the account of the events which led the subject
to agree to participate in the project, the meeting with the physician and the procedure of
informed consent. The observations were performed with an ethnographic methodology.
The analysis was both qualitative and quantitative. Interviews were recorded, transcribed
and submitted to qualitative textual analysis of content; answers to questionnaires were
statistically analysed in univariate analysis. The results described below allowed deriving
a typology of interactions related to informed consent.
Types of physician-subject interactions observed.
We were able to identify five main types of interaction between the recruiting physician
and the subjects whose consent for participation was targeted. We only had the
opportunity to carry out these observations in a systematic manner on the group of
‘control subjects’. These individuals were sent a letter asking them to participate in the
creation of the DNA bank and were offered a check-up on their level of risk for
cardiovascular diseases (they were not given the test results pertaining to their genetic
characteristics). The potential participants were invited to go to a health centre for a
blood test, undergo a number of medical examinations (electrocardiogram, doppler, body
fat measurement), and fill out a questionnaire about their lifestyle and their medical
history.
The group of subjects recruited in a hospital setting was more difficult to
approach. Although we found it relatively easy to carry out interviews with them after
their inclusion in the protocol, we could only observe in situ the admission into the
research protocol of a very limited number of cases (hardly a dozen), not enough for the
data collected to reach an adequate level of information saturation.
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 During the inclusion procedure, the informed consent form that the participants
were expected to sign was placed by the physician on the desk, on the side where the
participant was supposed to sit. The form was thus clearly displayed and put apart from
any other documents lying on the desk (labels, questionnaires, cards filled out by the
physician etc). The form repeated the main topics from the explanatory note previously
provided to the patient, to which he had already given his preliminary consent. It included
two or three additional items for which the participant had to indicate if he agreed to
• participation in a study on coronary diseases,
• participation in the creation of a DNA bank by giving a blood sample,
• willingness to be interviewed about his experience as a participant
Our own survey was thus included in the very procedure of informed consent, following
the intention expressed by the physician in charge of the DNA bank project to declare the
sociological survey to an ethics committee and to include it in the ethical framework of
the project itself.
The formulas used by the physician to present the form were usually quite
repetitive: after going through a short oral presentation of the study, which sums up the
explanatory note previously sent by surface mail, the physician asked the participant to
“read the document, sign it and feel free to ask questions if anything remains unclear”.
Most of the time, at this point, the physician took the form from the subject and signed
his name in the intended space before he gave it back to them.
The first type of interaction occurred in relation to the consent form itself. That is,
the form as such did not seem to play a prominent part in the exchanges between the
physician and the participant, in the sense that none of them made particular use of it.
Obviously, it was eventually signed by the participant, but this did not require any
question-response interplay, nor did it trigger any remark from one or the other. The
participant signed the document without uttering a word. The most direct way of
neglecting the ‘consent form’ consisted in adding the signature automatically without
reading it first.
The second type of interaction was characterized by a greater significance being
accorded to the signing procedure. The presentation of the consent form prompted a
certain number of participants to consider it and read it, sometimes with great attention.
The form then became a useful aid for discussing the conditions of participation in the
project. More than a simple aid for discussion, this procedure could therefore be
perceived as a third party which provided the participants in the DNA bank project with a
coherent framework for ethical decision making and the reduction of uncertainty.
The third type of interaction that emerged did not result in a reduction of
uncertainty through the exchanges that the form brought about. On the contrary, it
resulted in a significant increase of uncertainty. In those cases the procedure was not
called upon to expose the goals and modes of operation of the study or the uses of the
DNA bank. The procedure of informed consent was instead perceived as a judicial device
aimed at concealing something (“Why do I have to sign? Are there any risks?” one of the
participants asked). The dialogue then revolved around the potential risks that the
participants thought they might be exposed to if they gave their consent to the study:
“Are you going to put me under the knife to get my DNA? [...]. Then why should I have
to sign? I don’t even know where you want to take me to...” Questions were also raised
41
about the use that could be made of the genetic samples. “I hope you’re not going to
make GMOs or stuff like that, are you?”
As an extension of the third pattern of interaction, the fourth type exposes what
could be interpreted as a ‘game of non-commitment’ on the part of the participant, who
ticked the items but did not sign the form, or signed it but failed to fill it out thoroughly.
In such situations, the participants did not exactly refuse to sign or fill out the consent
form but, faced with a situation which they seemed to perceive as uncertain and risky,
they brought into play what we might call ‘avoidance tactics’. “The surest way of
averting danger is to avoid encounters where it might arise” (Goffman 1974: 17).
Finally, the last pattern we observed arose when the participants argued that their
word was as good a guarantee for their commitment to participate in the study as their
written consent. This pattern could be interpreted as the sign of a clash between two
conflicting modes of trust, one based on a written document and the other on the ‘given
word’. Some of the remarks these participants made lead us to believe that they perceived
the procedure as a sign of mistrust of them and of the genuineness of their commitment to
the project.
 Judging from the five types of interaction described above, it appears that the
procedure of consent is not self-evident or commonly accepted. It may generate distrust
or different forms of ‘avoidance’, induce tensions in the interactions between the
participants and the physician and even be openly criticized by the former. These
observations show what could appear to be a certain form of distrust on the part of the
participants towards a possible transfer of responsibilities which they see as the
consequence of having added their signature to formalize their consent. The
responsibility involved could cover several aspects: obviously, a judicial and
administrative aspect is involved, even though the wording on the consent form clearly
states that giving one’s consent in no way exempts the researchers and medical doctors
involved in the study from their responsibilities. But a moral aspect is also involved,
since the request for a signature seems to be perceived as the sign that the medical
personnel question the genuineness of the participant’s commitment. These observations
seem to point out that the frames of perception of the actors have reached a raised level of
awareness intended to detect a potential power asymmetry that could be the result of a
system which grants them greater autonomy and protection. From a quantitative point of
view, the patterns of interaction which indicated that these situations were likely to arise
(the third, fourth and fifth type) were not in the majority compared to the more common
situations which, on the contrary, seemed to show a lack of awareness (the cases where
the signature was added in silence, without reading the explanatory note first or
apparently without arising mistrust).
Consent as seen by its ‘subjects’
The interviews that we carried out with the participants in the days following their
inclusion in the research protocol shed light on the patterns of interaction that we have
briefly described above, as they gave us the opportunity to record their account of their
participation in the informed consent procedure, and consequently their points of view.
These interviews show that, even though in the majority of cases the procedure was not
truly condemned, the participants had not necessarily felt compelled to adhere to it
wholeheartedly, even in the case of those who had signed the consent form without any
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apparent hesitation. Surprisingly, the way consent is perceived by the ‘subjects’ exposes a
set of relatively systematized perceptions – and even points of view – that contradict a
number of statements  pertaining to medical ethics in general, and to the constitution of
biobanks in particular. Notably these perceptions highlight the ‘ambiguous’, paradoxical
nature of the informed consent procedure since, in the eyes of some, it grants individuals
a much greater autonomy, when for others it induces heteronomy in the relations between
individuals and the medical profession. Thus, far from developing a fairy-tale vision of
the biopolitics of consent, the points of view that we recorded point to the fact that
biopolitics might also carry elements of constraint and power that are relatively
unforeseen. They appear all the more insidious as they are embedded in procedures with
the objective to expand the subject’s autonomy.
Responsibilities
The relatively high incidence of interaction patterns characterized by the absence of
questions about the study on the part of the participant, or by the fact that a considerable
number of them added their signature without reading the consent form, can partly be
explained by the trust factor. The interpretation of a bond based on trust generally falls
under one of two types of analysis: one highlights the fact that trust is an act of self-
giving and submission to the power of another individual, and the other emphasizes that
the trust manifested by a partner always implies the opening of a debt that must be paid
off through some form of reciprocity.22 Obviously the second alternative does not
exclude the possibility of there being an unbalanced relationship between the two
partners. However, when giving their trust, individuals put the recipients in a position
where they have to comply with a moral obligation. It is precisely this obligation that
certain participants call upon in their accounts, as we observed in the course of the
interviews. The participants are encouraged to take an interest in the information
provided to them, to read the explanatory note and to eventually make what may be
described as an enlightened decision; yet, on the one hand, they feel incapable of acting
in an ‘informed’ manner, and on the other hand they express the trust they have invested
in the medical actors. This indicates that there is, in practice as well as in theory, a
profound gap between participants and a procedure that is intended to empower them to
act as informed and autonomous subjects.
Although according to the accounts of certain participants, there is no way of
knowing whether the DNA samples will be used in accordance with the existing
                                                
22
 As Karpik notes quoting Benveniste (1969), the relation of trust is an indication of an existing relation of
exchange governed by the rule of reciprocity: “one who receives trust is in fact granted an open line of
credit by his partner, and therefore his partner holds a letter of credit so the debt can only be cancelled by
an equally important compensation in the form of protection or guarantee (Karpik 1996: 528). Furthermore,
the relation of exchange is also grounded in unequal conditions, as shown by the secondary meaning of
fides (credit or trust): “putting one’s fides in another person brought in return their guarantee and their
support. But this very notion clearly shows that the conditions are not equal. Therefore there appears to be a
power of authority that is exercised concurrently with a power of protection over the individuals that
submit to it in exchange for their submission and as far as it extends. This relation implies the existence of a
power of constraint on the one hand, and obedience on the other hand.” (Benveniste 1969: 118-119).
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legislation or will serve ethically ‘condemnable’ purposes (“anyway if they want to do
cloning they aren’t going to tell us, so there is no way we can find out , and it’s not even
worth asking because they are not going to tell us”) the relation of trust called upon by
the participants places the biomedical actors in a situation of holding a moral debt that
they must pay off since failing to do so will bring about ‘punishment’, and this is where
we find one of the first attempts at describing the question of responsibility:
“I don’t give a damn about knowing what this research is about. It takes too long
to read [the explanatory note]. [...] Anyway I asked if I was going to feel
discomfort or something, of course. That’s what I want to know about. If I had
been asked to take drugs and come back every month, well, I might have
disagreed with that [...]; I don’t intend to go and find out if what I think about
genetics is true or completely wrong. There are doctors, I say, that’s what they’re
here for. Then it all depends on whether you want to trust them or not. [...] If you
want to be informed you’re wasting your time, it’s no use. [...] See, I’m a good
participant, I don’t ask questions [...]. I gave what I had to give. Now [it’s up to]
the doctors, [the] researchers, to do the rest. And I trust them to do what’s right. If
they put it to a bad use, God will punish them, and then the devil will burn their
feet. That’s just a way of describing it, but it’s what it comes down to, really.”
(Int. n° 35, 2nd age bracket, case subject)
This sort of account contradicts a number of studies carried out in the field of medical
ethics – quite often by physicians – that conclude that the state of ignorance of the
participants in the study is directly linked to their lack of information. According to these
studies, this lack of information is a result of either the elements provided being
intentionally partial, or their formulation being inappropriate and incomprehensible for
the lay public (Moutel 2003). The ignorance of the participants may also be voluntary
(Michael 1996) and associated with a concept of responsibility (of a medical, ethical and
moral kind) that should be ascribed to the medical actors. Applying these parameters to
the question of responsibility also contradicts all the ethical declarations mentioned in our
introduction that intend to turn the biopolitics of informed consent into the keeper of the
contemporary regulation system for the development and uses of gene technology.
It may be worth noting that the concept of responsibility invoked by some of the
participants we interviewed carries within itself, albeit in an implicit and popularized
form, the elements that provide the basis for a contemporary theoretical and critical
approach of those insitutionalized procedures which value the involvement and
participation of citizens. So the attempts made to avert the dangers associated with the
potential disengagement of the authorities and the medical institutions really have
enabled researchers to identify certain risks of misuse posed by the act of delegating
responsibility to citizens through their involvement in decisions concerning health or
biomedical research in the general sense (Polton 2000), and more particularly within the
framework of the advances in gene technology (Moulin 2000).
Even more explicitly, some of the accounts collected from participants set forth
their perception of the intrinsically ambiguous nature of the informed consent procedure.
The following remarks were formulated by another participant, who expressed his
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concern about the use that might be made of the DNA sample, and about the uncertainties
that lie heavily over the human genome research at large:
“ ‘Informed’, that would mean having the maximum, knowing the real objectives
of the experiment, and all the ins and outs, what it is really for, what act is going
to be performed... it sounds ambiguous to me! Because practically speaking what
do we know about their intentions? [...] If there is a hidden agenda, at least my
intention is not to manufacture weapons or ways to oppress the people. If they
[the actors of the DNA bank project] use it to make a diabolical weapon, I don’t
know but anyway, come to think of it, it’s not my responsibility. [...] Whatever
can be done with this knowledge, it doesn’t belong to me... So OK to do the
research, but then again, the applications may not be too good! Einstein worked
on relativity, but hey, what did Oppenheimer do with it... So we do research... but
again, when you think about it, it’s the responsibility of whoever takes
fundamental knowledge to decide if they want a biological weapon or a
vaccine...” (Int. N° 14, intermediary profession, 1st age bracket, control subject).
The question of responsibility arises all the more forcefully now that the participants have
become aware that certain risks linked to their involvement in a human genome research
project may turn out to be real. The ambiguity of the procedure is linked to the fact that it
is presented as a tool for delivering information fully and thoroughly, in a situation where
the information can only be partial and biased depending on the conclusion the
participant has drawn. From then on, the scheme is potentially seen as investing the
subject, who supposedly gave his ‘informed’ consent, with moral and ethical
responsibilities that the subject says he does not wish to assume and, more importantly,
that he says he cannot shoulder given his own knowledge of the project and the fact that
he cannot possibly know the intentions of others. Although the written dimension of the
consent makes individuals aware of the nature of the study in which they have agreed to
participate, it also simultaneously leads them to question openly the quality of the
information provided, which in turn leads them to fear that their ethical responsibility
might be coupled with legal responsibility as well:
“What I mean is that when I sign and I read something, the least I can do is pay a
little bit of attention because you never know what might happen next... maybe
they’ll want to take blood again, right? Now I don’t know what you’re going to do
with my genes; what do I know... [...] In medicine there are things we know about
and things we don’t know about. Some people even want to set up sperm banks.
Personally I’ve got nothing against it but, see, I for one wouldn’t do it. I say! I
wouldn’t like to know that my children are walking around like that. Maybe there
was a risk, who knows... I don’t know... but DNA?... what’s that?... they can’t...
the DNA is mine, it is my own, no one can use it... what do I know... what are
they going to do with the DNA? Why take all these precautions? They made me
sign that I agreed with all that, but why, I have no idea...” (Int. N° 30, Company
worker, 3rd age bracket, control subject).
45
Counter-intuitive asymmetry
We have until now chiefly addressed disapproving points of view expressed by the
participants about the consent procedure. The time has come to point out the existence of
more consensual points of view that nonetheless show an underlying critical approach to
the procedure. Quite surprisingly, certain participants brought to the fore the inability of
our survey to provide ‘decision-making clarification’, given the individualized
framework in which the consent was produced and that was part of the scheme itself.
Thus, one of the participants interviewed confessed that he did not feel ‘too well
informed’, but also pointed out that additional clarification might have been obtained
through a meeting designed to inform and promote exchanges between the potential
participants and the biomedical actors of the project. Far from criticizing the fact that
such a meeting had not been set up in advance in order to help participants understand the
ins and outs of the DNA bank project, he justified the absence of it. As a matter of fact,
he seemed to think that it was sensible not to set up an information meeting, as the
existing procedure seemed to generate higher rates of participation. Informing individuals
collectively would doubtlessly increase the level of interaction between the biomedical
team and the participants and would produce better informed decisions, but it might make
a greater number of potential participants ‘reluctant’:
“Oh, I don’t think I was well informed. What happened was, I was told to read the
paper, and I did, sort of, and then... but anyway, I already knew a bit about those
things, I could tell more or less what it was about. [...] Informed consent?... They
would have had to call everybody, put them all together in a room and teach them
for one hour. There. Then you can call yourself informed. But if you don’t do that,
if you just tell them “you know, look at that, hey, that’s what you need to do and
then that’s it”, well then the guy says yes, he tells you yes, but that doesn’t mean
he’s very well informed (he laughs). That’s right! You understand? If you take a
course, then you’re well-informed, “Does anybody have a question to ask?” Fine.
That’s informed. But you know what: I can see why they don’t want to do things
like that.  –Interviewer: Why? –Interviewee: (silence) because... let me tell you,
this is my own experience, the more you tell people, the more they go ‘yes, but’
and the more reluctant they get in the end. See? Because you make up your own
mind naturally, and you say I’ll do it. But then you’re in a room, and everybody is
saying ‘of course, there is this and that, you know, there’s that, there’s that!’ and
you end up with a bunch of people saying: ‘Well, after all, come to think of it,
maybe there’s some truth to it...’ and blah blah blah, and when all’s said and done,
instead of having thirty people that go for it, you end up with twenty-five. Or
twenty. So there. So for silly things like that it’s not worth getting people to argue
over nothing.” (Int. N° 44, Shopkeeper, 3rd age bracket, case subject).
These lines of reasoning show two dimensions of the issue that we believe are worth
emphasizing. On the one hand, they indicate that in the context of individualized consent-
building, underpinned by a procedure where the participants are called in one by one, the
situation seems to foster cooperation, and the participants refrain from intervening
actively in an exchange process. On the other hand, they point out that the existing
scheme, being designed to call in one person at a time, seems to prevent individuals from
using the resources that a group might offer when discussing participation and exposing
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the process involved. As we study the emic objectivation of the recruitment process and
the collection of consent, their structure seems to generate a certain number of effects on
decision-making and the nature of the act of cooperation involved. These effects, which
are of a counter-intuitive nature insofar as the consent procedure is supposed to lead the
individual to make an informed decision, might produce asymmetric power relations
between the participant(s) and the actors of the DNA bank.
Conclusions
The patterns of interaction that we have observed, as well as the points of view of the
participants recorded in interviews in many cases indicate that the frames of perception
and interpretation of the actors have reached a raised level of awareness intended to
detect the potential power asymmetry that might result from a scheme originally designed
to provide information and grant their autonomy. The actors in the field of medical
research regulation will find the elements in this study useful in planning the evolution of
their research and design its practical ethical framework, particularly in the case of
biobank projects. The informed consent procedure is not self-evident in the interactions
that take place, since many of its users prefer to call into play different ways of keeping
oneself at a distance (‘quant-à-soi’) to eschew the potential risks it could lead them to
assume: ‘avoidance’ of the signing procedure, refusal to append their signature, pressing
demands to the physician that he justifies this request, etc. Furthermore, the scheme may
be criticized for its formal layout and the abusive interpretation of the physician/patient
relationship that it seems to officialize by making it contractual. In the course of the
interviews we found an explanation centred on two important issues. The first one is the
diverse potential responsibilities that the participants identified and linked to their full
involvement in the informed consent procedure. The second issue is the counter-intuitive
asymmetry that might be generated by the individualized configuration of consent-
building. 
          Our survey points out that research participants call upon their critical abilities in
the application of the biopolitics of consent: they strive to detect any potential perverse
effects and do not hold a fairy-tale vision of it even if they do not contest it radically.
Their reactions and analyses, grounded or not, indicate caution in their assessment and a
critical approach towards any form of constraint that might result from the contemporary
implementation of biopolitics, and notably concerning the procedures for devolution of
responsibilities highlighted in the literature over the past few years. These reactions show
that the majority of the actors are inclined to adhere a priori to the current process of
biopolitics. In this case, DNA ‘donors’ should not be viewed as disappointed by the
institutional policy on the subject, which these days highlights the concept of user
autonomy, information and participation. It is obvious that these critical points of view
must not be seen solely as an agent retarding the progress of biobank projects, but also as
a competency likely to prove useful to the development of such projects, which may
provide the basis for a co-production process.23
The question of the devolution of responsibilities and the reactions it may stir
become all the more important since the context of the research which we have studied
overlaps with a sphere of knowledge and action which is, for more than one reason,
highly symbolic of the ‘risk society’ described by Bech (1992). The advances that enable
                                                
23
 For more about this topic, see chapter 9.
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us to explore the genomes, keep them in banks and preserve them and the potential
applications of this line of research contribute to feed the ‘anguished conscience’ which
seems to be the hallmark of the contemporary world of science and technology.
Therefore, the caution exercised by users when it comes to the new biopolitics is
understandable given the ‘anguished conscience’ of the world. This state of mind may
well be the reason why the actors involved in a procedure such as informed consent feel
the need to preserve their ‘quant-à-soi’. But this should not cause us to forget that the
biopolitics of informed consent may also in turn play a role in building this conscience. In
fact, it could well be that once confronted with the choice of what can and cannot be done
with the body and its parts, put in a situation they never had to face before, the actors can
only become more cautious, wary or even at times diffident when they consider the
responsibilities with which they may be invested.
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